NATIONAL PLAN
MILITARY MOBILITY

The Netherlands as a transit nation
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Appendix A - Strategic level goals, objectives & tasks for the Netherlands
1. Geostrategic Context

1.1 Constitutional Tasks

The changing strategic environment in and around Europe makes threats more tangible. Analyses show a downward trend regarding our overall security situation, a rise in tensions across a range of themes and this trend is likely to continue. The lines between military offensives, economic espionage or cyber threats are increasingly blurred. This reality has made clear once more that sustainable peace and security are not self-evident. Adapting to these ever faster dynamics requires a flexible, innovative whole-of-government and even whole-of-society approach. This changing security environment also justifies and explains a shift in focus in the (inter)national security policies of the Netherlands, a trend which is echoed by our allies. Whereas the focus in the past decades lay towards expeditionary missions further abroad, we see a renewed interest in the European theatre of operations as tangible tensions in the physical and cyber domain threaten our way of living. Looking at the constitutional tasks of the Netherlands Armed Forces, a similar shift can be observed. These tasks stipulate that the Netherlands Armed Forces exist to: 1. Defend the national territory and that of our allies, 2. Enforce the national and international rule of law, 3. Provide assistance during disasters and crises. This translates to the slogan “Defensie beschermt wat ons dierbaar is”: “The Netherlands Armed Forces protect what we value”. Taking the geostrategic reality as starting point, a shift in focus can be observed with a renewed emphasis on the first constitutional task of the Netherlands Armed Forces and whereby the remaining two work in unison to support the security of the Netherlands and, by extension, promote its international interests.

1.2 European Security

Adapting to security challenges in and around Europe, both the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as individual allies have taken a number of steps.

NATO is shifting its focus towards security and defence aspects within the territory of the Alliance, facing threats and challenges emanating from all strategic directions. At the same time crisismanagement and cooperative security remain fully relevant. This requires readiness, responsiveness and reinforcement of our forces in peace, crisis and conflict, including hybrid security challenges. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) provides the strategic framework, to ensure that the Alliance can respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. It includes a combination of reassurance measures, with the NATO Readiness Initiative as an example, and adaptation measures, which aim at strengthening the Alliance as a whole with the ultimate goal to strengthen and enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. The cornerstone of the Alliance remains the ability to cope effectively with external threats, in line with the first constitutional task of the Netherlands Armed Forces. This requires a successful and timely deployment of the NATO Response Forces and the Follow on Forces. The key element hereby is the Enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility (AOR, or Enablement), including the Atlantic Ocean. To do this, NATO defence ministers established two new NATO headquarters in 2018: Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC NF) and the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). When fully operational, they will contribute to enabling and securing, respectively, the North Atlantic area and part of the European landmass. For the Netherlands, these developments merit a renewed focus on enablement, and translating strategic requirements into practical initiatives. As a dedicated member of the Alliance, the Netherlands has concrete responsibilities as a contributing nation, host nation and transit nation. This focal shift consequently requires more attention to aspects of logistics and Host Nation Support (HNS), such as approving, controlling and coordinating movements in its territory and providing medical and engineering support.
The **EU** meanwhile has significantly stepped up its attention to security and defence related matters. The Netherlands supports a stronger, more resilient Europe which includes the European Union stepping up as a geostrategic player. With a stronger Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) also comes a stronger focus on resilience and credibility. Military mobility lies at the heart of this. The European Commission has created a new Directorate-General for Defence Industry & Space. The large toolbox of the EU includes mechanisms for regulations and coordination, whereby the Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA), among others, aim to harmonise legislation and simplify procedures. In addition, through the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, EU member states commit themselves to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities in a more coherent way. The European Defence Fund (EDF) aims at providing funds for these capabilities. The EU also has significant attention for improving the mobility of the armed forces of EU member states, on the one hand through work strands stemming from the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility, while on the other hand member states coordinate activities through the PESCO Project on Military Mobility, led by the Netherlands.

### 1.3 Defence Vision 2035

"We are frontrunners in the field of military mobility and are set up to function successfully as a transit nation and host nation." – Defence Vision 2035, design principle 4

The consequences of the geostrategic reality increasingly puts pressure on the Dutch security interests. To protect what we value, the Netherlands Armed Forces need to have a strong, resilient and adequate response. The growing demand for defence deployment widens the gap between tasks on the one hand and capabilities, supplies and support on the other. The preponderance of NATO, on which we rely heavily, is under pressure. Europe has to be able to act more independently, to keep the Alliance strong as well as fostering a stronger, more resilient European Union. This is part of the in-depth analysis of the Netherlands Defence Vision 2035. Herein, 10 key design principles are laid out which detail what it is that the Netherlands Armed Forces need to be able to do in order to fulfil the core tasks for which it stands. To be more precise, design principle 9 "Focus on further specialisation within NATO and the EU" is of particular importance for military mobility as is the exploratory annex III. It further emphasises the importance of fulfilling the previously stated responsibilities within NATO’s Enablement of SACEUR’s AOR, as well as a continuation of a strong commitment to the EU’s CSDP.

### 2. Military Mobility

#### 2.1 Definition

The mobility of the armed forces is a key factor in determining the potential success of a military operation. The speed at which troops and assets can be moved to the area of operations directly determines the response time during a crisis situation. In other words, military mobility at its core aims at minimising the time between Notice to Move (NTM) and Notice to Effect (NTE). Military mobility can be as broadly defined as the sum of activities within the domain of movement & transportation, logistic support and the condition of related enablers including infrastructure and rules and regulations.
In addition, effective military mobility enhances deterrence by showing potential adversaries that the Netherlands Armed Forces and their allies can and will be available whenever and where ever necessary. Finally, effective military mobility enhances our resilience against the full spectrum of threats. While this has been common knowledge from a military point of view for a long time, a plethora of peacetime rules and regulations, as well as a shifted political focus to expeditionary missions has hampered progress. Improving military mobility is a matter of credibility and deterrence for both NATO and the EU. To address the changes in the geostrategic environment, core actors in the Netherlands’ security architecture like the EU and NATO, have developed a number of strategic concepts.

2.2 Political Support
Since 2018, military mobility has featured high on the agenda in both the EU and NATO. In a letter to the EU High Representative and NATO Secretary General, Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert called upon both institutions and its member states that “the obstacles to cross-border military transport in Europe must disappear”, and that all involved parties should work closely together to address this. To lead the way politically, a PESCO Project on Military Mobility was launched and around the same time the Roadmap of the European Defence Agency was presented, followed shortly thereafter by the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility. The political momentum led to a number of political commitments on both the EU and NATO side, as well as the emergence of military mobility as a priority topic for EU-NATO cooperation. These political commitments remain the cornerstone for national improvements within EU member states.

The importance of improved military mobility, including testing it, is shared by other strategic partners, in particular the United States of America (USA). Military mobility supports their operational plans for deploying troops in Europe in order to protect and defend its allies. It is therefore especially important for the USA that multiple multimodal corridors are established in order to support large scale military movements to, through and from Europe, and that these are tested regularly. Military mobility will intensively be tested in the coming years. Due to its geographical location, the Netherlands plays a strategic role as both a transit and host nation in supporting these large scale military movements. There is a mutual dependency between sending nations and the Netherlands, emphasising the need for sustained cooperation on military mobility.

2.3 Purpose of a National Plan
The member states of the European Union collectively agreed to develop national plans for military mobility and give their implementation high priority.¹ These national plans are to be central to national efforts in the coming years. With this National Plan on Military Mobility, the Netherlands chooses to centre its national efforts around the concept of ‘transit nation’ – taking its role as a strategically located country through which military movements transit safely and swiftly. Effectuating this requires a whole-of-government effort and approach. To that end, an intergovernmental working group will be established in the Netherlands.

Improving the mobility of the armed forces relies to a large extent on steps taken at the national level. Individual nations need to assess where and how procedures and logistical processes can be smoothened. This national plan provides strategic guidance and identifies concrete steps for improving military mobility within and through the Netherlands for both EU and NATO activities. It embraces interoperability with NATO principles and policies

¹ EU FAC June 25, 2018 paragraph 19.a.
on HNS and the Allied Joint HNS doctrine and procedures, as well as the principles, doctrine and procedures from the EU Concept for Host Nation Support for EU-led Military Operations and Missions. It serves as a policy framework for actions to be taken at the national level and includes all relevant activities aimed at improving military mobility, both ongoing as well as new activities. This plan does not foresee or provide for funding for specific activities. Any financial implications stemming from this plan will be detailed out in the implementation phase, upon recommendation by the interdepartmental working group and following standing budget procedures within the relevant ministries. This plan is valid until December 31, 2025 but actions stemming from work strands within this plan may have a running time well beyond this date. Stressing the importance of a whole-of-government approach, this national plan is approved and supported by the Cabinet.

3. The Netherlands as Transit Nation

3.1 Gateway To Europe

Being a small country with a large population, the Netherlands has developed a highly efficient infrastructure network with a focus on innovative solutions. Combined with an established track record in trade, an international business climate and its geographic location within Europe, the Netherlands has a particular role in being the ‘Gateway to Europe’. From a business perspective, the Netherlands is a strategic logistic hub with a strong service based economy. From a military logistics point of view, the same values apply. The geostrategic importance and political ambitions are well aligned.

The Netherlands will establish three nationwide multimodal corridors including three logistic hubs to support (large scale) military movements. These corridors will be aligned with the military requirements for military mobility, both physically and geographically, and supported by effective processes and regulations in order to meet the timelines to which the Netherlands has committed itself internationally.

3.2 Three Multimodal Corridors

Military movements within the Netherlands are currently being planned on an ad-hoc, case by case basis by dedicated and experienced military and civilian personnel. Often, the same corridors are used by Dutch and allied forces, along with the same ports of embarkation (POE) and debarkation (POD) and the same convoy support centres. There is a frequent repetition of requests for local permits, slots for rail tracks or dangerous goods waivers. These routes are largely predictable. Established multimodal corridors in the Netherlands will simplify the planning processes and will make military movements more effective and efficient. This shifts the focus from questions of ‘where’ and ‘what’ to a focus on ‘when’. The choice for three corridors stems from the military planning process. NATO doctrine emphasises the importance of redundancy and resilience in planning crises response measures. Having two corridors available for military logistics, one outbound and one return, leaves a third corridor available for civilian and refugee purposes and builds in strategic redundancy should one route be unavailable. Additionally, having fixed corridors in place increases transparency, predictability and creates an

\[\text{Main Supply Routes} \text{ according to AJP-4.5, p. 31.}\]
opportunity for long term agreements with local public and private partners, from dangerous goods waivers to supply contracts. It increases the value of the Netherlands as a strategic and reliable security partner both nationally and internationally. In close cooperation with the ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management, priority shall be given to optimising the two most frequently used corridors.

3.3 Three Logistic hubs
To support military mobility, each multimodal corridor shall be supported by a dedicated logistic hub. These hubs will entail a variety of services to support military movements, including but not limited to RSOM\(^3\) and convoy support facilities and will be a key enabler to streamline deployment activities. The establishment and functionalities of each logistic hub is being developed within the PESCO Framework in the Project Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe & Support to Operations. Ultimately, the aim is to establish a Europe-wide network of logistic hubs, which would accelerate military mobility and increase sustainment capabilities.

In addition, by establishing three multimodal corridors, the Netherlands plans to hold up to its international commitments as agreed on at the highest political level at both NATO and the EU in the summer of 2018. EU member states have agreed to work towards, among other deliverables, granting permissions for cross border movements within five working days and to consider bringing that period down further. NATO has echoed these commitments and publicly called for permissions within five days. Implementing these commitments requires a whole-of-government approach and improvements in a number of areas.

4. Process & Governance
4.1 Whole-of-government
Improving military mobility is a responsibility that goes well beyond the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. It is a shared effort between a range of national and local governmental actors. The Netherlands Armed Forces are bound to civil laws to allow them to move assets, they drive across public infrastructure and apply for permits and waivers through public channels. At the same time, public awareness regarding the interests of the armed forces has significantly diminished in the past few decades. For example, when determining infrastructural legislation, a range of requirements was included from environmental to economic factors. The military requirements were however omitted.

**Focus point 1:**
In order to steer and oversee activities stemming from this national plan, a cross-governmental working group shall be established, chaired by the Ministry of Defence and with active involvement from all relevant ministeries. This working group shall establish its own governance procedures and, initially, meet on a part-time basis. This working group shall be supported by and report to a similarly composed cross-governmental steering group at the director-general level and convene periodically. This working group’s first task shall be to operationalise the in this national plan defined ambitions, advice on feasibility of the proposed actions and deliver a project plan subjected to approval through relevant standing procedures. The project plan shall include ambitious but feasible timelines for these improvements and is to be finished by December 31st, 2021. Any financial consequences stemming from this project plan shall follow standing budgetary

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\(^3\) Receiving, Staging & Onward Movement.
procedures. A bi-annual progress report shall be delivered to the involved ministers in the Netherlands. The working group and its activities will be embedded within the standing organisations of the involved ministries, with a dedicated secretariat within the Ministry of Defence and dedicated points of contact within the involved ministries.

4.2 Infrastructure
Establishing three multimodal corridors for both EU and NATO Host Nation Support transiting activities requires having in place adequate infrastructure along these routes. First and foremost, the infrastructure along these corridors has to comply with the internationally agreed military requirements for military mobility. To a large extent this entails public infrastructure, under the leading authority of the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management. For the logistic hubs, this falls under the leading authority of the Ministry of Defence. Secondly, the facilities and capabilities at the Sea/Airports and logistic hubs need to facilitate swift military movements, which includes the capabilities to host allied troops at short notice. These corridors also have to comply with the internationally established military requirements for military mobility. The groundwork for this has already started.\(^4\) In close cooperation between the Ministries of Defence and Infrastructure & Water Management, a detailed analysis of Dutch infrastructure has been carried out. The resulting report showed that many aspects of Dutch infrastructure already comply with those military requirements. A number of important improvements are already planned between now and 2030. At the same time, this report provided a number of options to further the work on this issue. These two ministries have agreed to continue this work strand in the coming years.

**Focus point 2:**
*The cross-governmental working group shall identify and prioritise infrastructural improvements to be made across the three multimodal corridors. Where possible, identified improvements will be embedded within existing programs such as the Multi-annual Program for Infrastructure, Environment & Transport (MIRT).\(^5\) External funding, in particular available funds through the Connecting Europe Facility, shall be sought to bring along these improvements.*

4.3 Rules & Regulations
A major hurdle for effective military movements is the multitude of rules and regulations that affect the armed forces, both nationally and across Europe. Overcoming those hurdles is twofold: there is a need to change certain legislation and to find practical working agreements with stakeholders. With regard to the former, it is of particular importance to identify legislation regarding the movement and storage of dangerous goods as well as to critically look at existing legal discrepancies between military and commercial transports. Along the multimodal corridors, a number of arrangements will have to be made with local public authorities. These include, for example, agreements with local authorities for the transportation of dangerous goods or service agreements with commercial partners regarding short notice availability of supplies. This should not only be seen as a necessity, but also as an opportunity to look at the best solutions to suit both military and civilian needs locally.

As a first step, the Netherlands has introduced standing diplomatic clearances for all EU and NATO partners. When wishing to move assets through the Netherlands, sending nations no longer have to formally apply to do

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\(^{5}\) *Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte & Transport.*
so, a digital notification suffices. Of course, practical arrangements like the time and location of arrival will always need to be considered.

**Focus point 3:**
The cross-governmental working group shall identify and prioritise relevant legislation with the aim to increase military mobility. They will propose, where applicable, changes to these regulations. In addition, the working group will identify and prioritise which agreements with (local) public and private stakeholders should be made and, upon advice by the steering group, embeds implementation thereof within the relevant ministries.

### 4.4 Command & Control

A military operation can only succeed with a clearly defined command and control structure (C2). The same logic applies during peacetime conditions. Stakeholders need to be able to find each other quickly, and these lines of communication need to be durable and reliable. A good C2 network, supported by adequate CIS and qualified and trained personnel, is efficient, available 24/7 where necessary and includes built-in redundancies. The lines of communication are multi-fold, partially within the armed forces and partially between the military and civilian stakeholders.

The EU Foreign Affairs Council has agreed to establish “an interconnected network of national points of contact”. Additionally, NATO has asked to establish a single national point of contact (sNPOC). For the Netherlands, both functions are currently located centrally at the Defence Staff level in one and the same office. It serves as the single point of contact for all matters related to the Netherlands as transit and host nation for both NATO and the EU. Additionally, to coordinate and oversee HNS operations, the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) has established a Territorial Operations Centre (TOC), and the Defence Support Command has established the National Movement Coordination Centre (NMCC) as an important entity for military movements through the Netherlands. At the civilian side, key players like the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkwaterstaat), the rail management and infrastructure agency (Prorail) and the National Coordinator For Counterterrorism & Security (NCTV) are all part of the national C2 network.

**Focus point 4:**
In order to ensure effective lines of communication the cross-governmental working group shall map the C2 structure for Military Mobility, including large scale military movements, and recommend procedural changes where necessary. The renewed and agreed C2 structure shall then be embedded within the relevant ministries.

### 4.5 Digital innovation

A number of procedural delays are amplified by outdated information systems. These systems lack the adaptivity that a modern, interconnected network of stakeholders requires. For example, creating real-time situational awareness regarding military movements is a recognised challenge. This applies to the entire field of military mobility. Cross border movements are planned and executed using a multitude of IT systems. The Netherlands believes that improvements are achievable. By combining user experiences from subject matter experts with innovative solutions it is possible to improve procedures whilst at the same time providing those involved with better situational awareness. An example thereof is the interactive Host Nation Support system (iHNS), which was developed and delivered within 10 months through an innovative bottom-up process by combining technical
private sector IT experts with military logistics experts from the Netherlands and multiple partner countries. The system is a planning tool for the strategic military level, to be used when planning HNS activities.

Focus point 5:
Using the iHNS system as a starting point, the cross-governmental working group shall identify innovative solutions to speed up (the processes of) military mobility, and make recommendations for implementation thereof. Where possible, these innovations will be offered to partner countries as a best practice.

4.6 Whole-of-society
A changing society justifies a change in the way the Netherlands Armed Forces operate. The military can no longer afford to organise everything by itself, nor does it have the capacities to do so. In addition, they are dependent on civilian stakeholders to enable military movements, be it in granting permits or by providing local civilian assistance. Developing good relationships with these national stakeholders is therefore in the interest of the armed forces. In order to remain fit for the future, the Netherlands has introduced the Adaptive Armed Forces concept. Within this concept, capacities are no longer purchased by default, owned or maintained by the military. Rather, a differentiation in readiness is created in which materiel and personnel capacities are available on demand, when and where needed. This ensures peak loads can be better absorbed through creating more flexible operational management. Adaptive Armed Forces unmistakably adds value to military logistic supply chains. Think, for example, of intensified cooperation on assured access to strategic lift capabilities with flexible commercial partners, or agreements with local governments regarding permits in order to align rules and regulations with national military mobility ambitions. In the Defence Vision 2035, design principle 10 details this further.

Focus point 6:
With the Adaptive Armed Forces concept in mind, the cross-governmental working group shall identify and prioritise areas of cooperation which are of direct benefit to military mobility. In particular, efforts are to be made with regard to creating a ‘Logistical Ecosystem’, as well as durable working relationships with relevant local parties in or near the multimodal corridors.

4.7 Exercises
In order to assess whether policy improvements are successful, it is important to regularly test such assumptions. Live exercises offer the best combination of practical testing of procedures, whilst providing military personnel with training opportunities. The Netherlands believes in an effective cycle of exercises across a wide range of activities in the field of military mobility. These can range from smaller table top exercises to large scale multinational division-sized exercises. It is important to organise exercises in close cooperation with partner countries, both as a sending nation and as a host nation. In particular, as a transit nation, the Netherlands wants to continue to test the possibilities and limitations of military movements to, through and from of the Netherlands.
Focus point 7:
The cross-governmental working group shall identify and recommend participation in relevant military mobility related exercises, both national and international. As a transit nation, the Netherlands shall continue to actively contribute to exercises from partner countries wishing to transit through the Netherlands.

5. International Contributions

“We want to distinguish ourselves even further on the international stage in the field of military mobility. We currently play a pioneering role in this respect and we want to maintain that position.” – Defence Vision 2035, design principle 4

5.1 Connecting The Dots

Improving military mobility is a common effort. Effective military movements to a large part depend on swift border crossings and this frequently encompasses multiple countries. The Netherlands wants to continue its role as lead nation on this important topic. To achieve this, the emphasis will be twofold: Coordinating the PESCO Project on Military Mobility and furthering EU-NATO cooperation to achieve concrete results. In addition, the Netherlands will continue to actively support the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility, most notably by chairing the EDA Category A Program on Harmonising the Military Requirements Related to Customs, and by participating in other work strands including the EDA Category A Program on Optimising Cross Border Movement Permission Procedures in Europe. The PESCO Project Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe & Support to Operations will also be supported.

Within NATO, active support will be given to those work strands within Enablement of SACEUR’s AOR most closely related to military mobility. In addition, as one of the leading participants in JSEC, the Netherlands will continue to support the headquarters on its path to full operational capability, whereby it will play a key role in military mobility at the operational level. Lastly, other multinational fora like the Northern Group offer a mutually beneficial platform where likeminded countries can deepen their cooperation. These fora may benefit from political guidelines, thus, where appropriate the Netherlands will continue to look for relevant commitments at the highest political levels.

5.2 PESCO Project Military Mobility

As the sole platform on the strategic-political level, the PESCO Project Military Mobility offers a direct link between EU member states, as well as to the actors of the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility. The project functions as a platform to initiate, coordinate and guide the different military mobility efforts with an emphasis on national implementation.

The four deliverables stemming from the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of June 25, 2018 remain the cornerstone of actions to be taken nationally. The EU member states have agreed to (1) develop national plans on military mobility and give their implementation high priority; (2) grant cross border permission for routine activities within five working days; (3) create a strong and interconnected network of National Points of Contact; and (4) to practice military mobility more regularly in suitable existing national and multinational exercises. The commitment was made to achieve this by the end of 2019. While good progress is being made, the Netherlands
believe that there are numerous challenges remaining in truly implementing these four deliverables. The focus for the PESCO Project Military Mobility should therefore be on delivering on these commitments, most prominently to achieve a five (working) day approval time for cross border movements, to begin with, but not limited to, routine activities. By truly achieving what member states have collectively agreed upon, this will result in a major step forward for military mobility across the EU and directly benefiting NATO allies as well.

To help guide this work, and to formalize procedures within the foreseeable growth of the PESCO Project on Military Mobility, a working arrangement shall be introduced by the Netherlands wherein topical and procedural agreements can be noted down. In addition, the Netherlands believes that member states as well as the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility can benefit from additional political guidance. Therefore, the Netherlands will, where appropriate, seek additional commitments at the political level. Furthermore, the Netherlands will continue to look for possibilities in realising third country participation, as improving military mobility is an important effort not just for EU member states, but also our strategic partners.

5.3 EU-NATO Cooperation

The EU and NATO both have a unique role to play in the area of military mobility. Whereas NATO provides the hard power framework within which military forces operate, including all related aspects, the EU can enable operational military needs by creating the right conditions for military personnel to do their job effectively, most prominently in the fields of legislation and infrastructure. Recognising the different roles both organisations have, they nevertheless share a common goal of fostering effective European security. Military mobility in particular is regarded a flagship topic of cooperation, and both institutions unmistakably have made tangible steps herein. As an example, the ‘Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU’ take NATO’s military needs into account. A structured dialogue between the staffs of both institutions creates a forum for discussion. These steps possess the potential to work towards an alignment of terms and efforts between both organisations.

Furthermore, the Netherlands believes additional improvements are desirable. When it comes to European defence and security as a whole, and military mobility in particular, both organisations have similar goals but tend to apply different terms of reference, or use different procedures including similar yet slightly different forms. This causes confusion and has already hampered progress, for example in harmonising procedures related to customs. Closer, mutually beneficial cooperation must be achieved in order to strengthen the security architecture in Europe and prevent a duplication of efforts. As a member state to both organisations, the Netherlands will work towards bridging the gap between both organisations and strive to prevent duplicating efforts and diverging policies.
## Appendix A – Strategic level goals, objectives & tasks for the Netherlands

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<td>Credibility &amp; Deterrence</td>
<td>Improving military mobility in terms of efficiency &amp; effectiveness</td>
<td>Implement National Plan Military Mobility</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased strategic value as reliable security partner</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipping multiple multimodal corridors Enable digital innovation Enable efficient &amp; redundant C2 structure Create Logistical Ecosystem</td>
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<td>Uphold NATO commitments</td>
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<td>Actively support the Enablement of SACEUR’s AOR</td>
<td>Successful &amp; timely deployment of VJTF, NRF &amp; Follow-on Forces</td>
<td>Implementing host-, transit- and contributing nation targets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enable PESCO Project Military Mobility and support related initiatives actively</td>
<td>Contribute to improving military mobility in Europe Better invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities together</td>
<td>Initiate, coordinate and connect the different military mobility efforts with an emphasis on national implementation at the strategic level Contribute to improving the physical aspects on the military supply routes Contribute to adjusting relevant laws, regulations &amp; procedures</td>
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